Abstract. Multivariate public-key cryptosystems (sometimes polynomial-based PKC's or just multivariates) handle polynomials of many variables over relatively small fields instead of elements of a large ring or group. The "tame-like" or "sparse" class of multivariates are distinguished by the relatively few terms that they have per central equation. We explain how they differ from the "big-field" type of multivariates, represented by derivatives of C * and HFE, how they are better, and give basic security criteria for them. The last is shown to be satisfied by efficient schemes called "Enhanced TTS" which is built on a combination of the Oil-and-Vinegar and Triangular ideas. Their security levels are estimated. In this process we summarize and in some cases, improve rank-based attacks, which seek linear combinations of certain matrices at given ranks. These attacks are responsible for breaking many prior multivariate designs.
Introduction: Multivariate and Tame-like PKC's
Multivariate public-key cryptosystems (sometimes just multivariates 3 ) operate on long vectors over small fields, in contrast to the huge rings and groups of better-known schemes. A typical multivariate PKC over the base field K has a public map comprising three portions. In the notations of [3, 35] , we write it as V = φ 3 • φ 2 • φ 1 : K n → K m . The maps φ 1 : w → x = M 1 w + c 1 and φ 3 : y → z = M 3 y + c 3 are affine in K n and K m respectively and usually invertible. We call φ 2 the central map and the equations giving each y j in the x i 's the central equations. The security of the scheme is then based on the NPhardness [15] in solving a large system of quadratics and difficulty in decomposing V into the components φ i . The speed of the public map and the size of the keys depend only on m and n. The speed of the private map depends on how fast a preimage for φ 2 : x → y can be obtained, and key generation on the complexity of φ 2 . A good quick reference on various multivariates can be found in [33] .
Recently there has been renewed interest in multivariate PKC's, and we will
-Characterize tame-like PKC's, a subset of multivariates (Sec. 1). Show that they are efficient and possibly very useful in low-resource deployments. -Review the security concerns of tame-like PKC's including linear-algebra related attacks (collectively, "rank attacks", Sec. 5), in some cases generalized and improved viz. Sec. 9, modern Gröbner Bases related methods, and others (Sec. 10). -Give basic criteria for proper design of a tame-like multivariate scheme (Sec. 10). Build (Sec. 4) a scalable sequence of schemes satisfying these conditions using a combination of the triangular and oil-and-vinegar themes.
Note: old version at e-Print archive report 2004/061
; full version to be up later.
Pros and Cons for Multivariates
For a long time, cryptologists were not very interested in multivariates because traditional PKC's are considered "good enough". The large keys of multivariates also causes problems in key storage, management, and generation for PKI setup and maintenance. Furthermore, the last two decades saw many proposed multivariates broken, so there is some general distrust of multivariates. But multivariate are getting another look because 1. The relative slowness of RSA does affect deployment (e.g., co-processors cost) and some environments are simply too real-time-oriented or resourcepoor for RSA (i.e. lower-cost RFID). A multivariate-like structure may do better [14] . 2. In some multivariate schemes, keys can be generated blockwise possible in real time on a smart card, which ameliorates the on-card storage problem. 3. Quantum computing may become reality in two decades, bringing a sea change.
The slowness of current progress [30] belies the lack of recent advances in factoring technique, but at CHES 2004, Dr. Issac Chuang reported on QC and estimated less than 2 decades to practicality. RSA and discrete-log based schemes will then be broken by Shor's Algorithm [28] , but multivariates are more resistant 4 . Quantum physics can also accomplish a secure key exchange, but so far lacks the functionality of digital signatures. Thus alternative digital signature schemes are being sought.
Tame-like Multivariates
In one type of multivariates including the HFE [26] and C families [22, 27] , φ 2 represents a function in a huge field. They are termed big-field or two-field [33] , and generate keys via an interpolation-based procedure in ∼ n 6 time [31] .
Lower-powered systems, especially low-end embedded ones, needs to do better. A multivariate is termed tame-like if its central equations average a small number (vs. ∼ n 2 /2 terms for a random quadratic) of terms -say ≤ 2n each -and can be inverted quickly, e.g., faster than evaluating the public map. Since a tame-like map takes only O(n 2 ) instead of O(n 3 ) time to evaluate, key generation via interpolation would take at most O(n 5 ) time. However, we can do even better than that: Proposition 1. Keys can be generated for a tame-like multivariate in time O(n 4 ).
Proof. Following Imai and Matsumoto [22] , we divide the coefficients involved in each public key polynomial into linear, square, and crossterm portions thus:
R ijk , which comprise most of the public key, may be computed as follows (as in [35] ):
The second sum is over all cross-terms p x α x β in the central equation for y . For every pair i < j, we can compute at once R ijk for every k in O(n 2 ) totalling O(n 4 ). Similar computations for P ik and Q ik take even less time.
Therefore set-up times for a tame-like multivariate be two-orders-of-magnitudes faster than non-tame-like ones. On a low-cost smartcard, on-demand public-key generation from private info (O(n 2 ) storage) can be done in real time (cf. Tab. 1).
Triangular Maps, Tame Maps and the TTS Family
The prototype of tame-like φ 2 is the tame transformation from algebraic geometry. With dimensions m ≥ n over the base field K, this is a polynomial map φ : K n → K m , taking x to y either affinely (y = Mx + c) or in de Jonquiere form with
On tame transformations, sometimes called triangular maps, is based the public-key encryption scheme TTM [23] . This concept was adapted and extended the concept [3] to include all polynomial maps without a low degree explicit inverse for which an inverse can be found without solving anything higher than linear equations. We will call term such maps tame, and ( [3] ) TTS is defined as a multivariate DSS with a tame central map. For example, with n = 28, m = 20, φ 2 : [23] . They further expanded their scope to all "TPM" (triangular-plus-minus) systems [16] . Oil-and-Vinegar attacks invented by Kipnis et al [19, 20] against OV/UOV schemes.
The Rank or Low Rank Attack
Let q = |K|, and r be the smallest rank in linear combinations of central equations, which without loss of generality we take to be the first central equation itself. Goubin and Courtois [16] outline how to break TPM in expected time O(q m n r m 3 ):
an undetermined linear combination of the symmetric matrices representing the homogeneous quadratic portions of the public keys. [16] did not mention this, but when char K = 2 the quadratic portion of z i cannot be written as w T Q i w, with the matrices Q i symmetric. However there is still a unique symmetric matrix that can represent z i , namely
with all indices distinct will have a corresponding symmetric matrix with kernel {x :
We will call this the kernel of the quadratic and use the shorthand ker y i (or ker x y i to specify what space). With cross-terms with distinct indices, the rank of the matrix is 2 . Hence ker x y k = {x :
2. Guess at a random k-tuple (w 1 , . . . , w k ) of vectors in K n , where k = m n . Set P w 1 = · · · = P w k = 0 and solve for λ i via Gaussian elimination. When this is uniquely solvable P is likely the quadratic part of y 1 , the first central equation.
3. Assume the matrix corresponding to y 1 has a rank of r, then its kernel (the inverse image H −1 1 (0)) has dimension n − r, hence when we guess at (w 1 , . . . , w k ) randomly, they have a probability of at least q −kr to be all in H −1 1 (0). This P is the quadratic portion of y 1 and the coefficients λ i the row of M 
The Dual Rank or High Rank Attack
The Rank Attack finds a large kernel shared by a small subset of the space spanned by the matrices H i . The converse, to find a small kernel shared by a many linear combinations of the H i , may be called a Dual Rank attack or High Rank attack. It happens when a variable appears in too few central equations.
In Birational Permutation Schemes, the last central variables x n appears the cross-terms of only one equation. This critical weakness [5] means we can find linear combinations i α i z i whose kernels share a non-empty intersection. Coppersmith, Stern, and Vaudenay [5] then construct an ascending chain of kernels in the matrix algebra over a ring without needing to search. In [16] , a simpler version of the dual rank attack was run via searching, and we can describe this as follows:
Without loss of generality, let the fewest number of appearances of all variables in the cross-terms of the central equations be the last variable x n−1 appearing u times.
In TTS/2 , this is x 27 , which only appears in y 27 . So whenever α 27 = 0, the
(Here H i and Q i are as in Sec. 6.) If we denote by m ij the (i, j)-entry of M 3 , then almost every (H i , H j ) pair has a linear combination with a kernel containing the same subset U . In general, with almost any (u + 1)-subset picked from the H i , a unique linear combination of these matrices has a kernel containing U = {x : x 0 = · · · = x n−2 = 0}. We try to find U . q u field multiplications if we only consider linear combinations of (u + 1) of the matrices H i , and are not too unlucky.
Form an arbitrary linear combination H
From this subspace, we can find bigger kernels. [5] does this through taking a sequence of derivatives. For TPM as for TTS/2', the next bigger kernel (which is U = {x 0 = x 1 = · · · = x 25 = 0}) can be found by examing subspaces of V , which will get us U with probability 1/q. So for TTS/2 , the flaw is severe and cryptanalysis is swift.
Unbalanced Oil-and-Vinegar Attacks and a Simplification
An (Unbalanced) Oil-and-Vinegar attack [19, 21] on a multivariate takes place if we may partition the variables x i into sets O and V, such that there is no cross-term with both variable in O. The two sets are called the oil and vinegar variables respectively. Suppose a maximal set of vinegar variables is at least size v, then Kipnis et al find the oil subspace (the space spanned by the oil variables) by looking at certain linear combinations that become degenerate. The average time complexity is q 2v−n−1 (n − v) 4 . TTS/2 fits this description with v = 14 (V is the variables with even indices). An OV or UOV attack in essence let the attacker eliminate some variables. This often let the attacker get around whatever devices that defend against a rank attack. In [11] , Ding and Yin cryptanalyze the instance of TTS given in [35] on such an oversight. They used a sequence of fairly intricate manuevers after the UOV stage. In this and certain other cases, we could make cryptanalysis using the UOV attack a little simpler, as below: 
Proof. Follow the steps in [19] to distill the oil subspace. Now, if it were really an UOV scheme, we would be able to find a solution in time (n− v) 3 /3 (i.e., time for one Gaussian elimination). However, this requires us to be able to guess at v variables. Since we can only fix n − m variables and expect to find a solution, on average we rate q v−(n−m) random guesses during the the cryptanalysis.
More About Rank-Based Attacks
Rank-based attacks are important considerations against tame-like (and perhaps other) multivariates. The various authors already did a fine job of presenting the methods. One notable correction we would like to make is the estimate for dualrank attacks in [16] (unquestioned by later works) is given as n 6 q u when it should be un 2 + n 3 6 q u (field multiplications) as given in Sec. 7. It is easy to fall to any of these three attacks if one is careless, e.g., in the RSE(2)PKC and RSSE(2)PKC schemes of Kasahara-Sakai that falls ( [32] ) to an almost verbatim attack from [16] . These are generalizations of TPM that C. Wolf et al call Stepwise Triangular Schemes (STS). As discussed in [33] , the basic STS constructions cannot be used alone. We may also surmise that to depend fundamentally on guessing can be a very bad idea for non-big-field multivariates.
There is one potential improvement to the Rank Attack that has not been mentioned by previous investigators. In Sec. 6 
. That is at least 10, 000 total combinations. We call this interlinks. When the largest kernels and equations interlink, the Rank Attack can be made faster by the crawl process below. Odds of finding a kernel vector in the [16] attack is then essentially multiplied by the number of distinct kernels.
Proposition 4 (Interlinked Kernels). If there are c kernels of codimension r that interlink, then we can cryptanalyze in an expected q kr kmn(m + n)/c field multiplications.
We take again as the example TTS/2 . For simplicity, let all coefficients be 1, then ker y 8 = {x : x 0 = x 1 = · · · = x 7 = 0}; ker y 9 = {x : x 1 = x 2 = · · · = x 8 = 0}; ker y 10 = {x : x 2 = x 3 = · · · = x 9 = 0}; ker(y 8 + αy 9 ) = {x :
ker(y 8 + αy 10 ) = {x :
With generic coefficients, there will be a three-term combination that has rank 8 exists (here it does not). Its kernel would be vectors x with x 4 = x 5 = 0 and x 0 : x 2 : x 6 : x 8 and x 1 : x 3 : x 7 : x 9 in fixed ratios. We now proceed along these steps:
1. Run the algorithm of Sec. 6 to find a kernel vector u and its associated quadratic z = i λ i z i of rank 8. Verify U = ker z to be of codimension 8, and find a basis for U . Given any rank 8 kernel when (m, n) = (20, 28) multiplications. There being only 20 forms y i and about 5000 forms y i + αy i+1 (and almost as many y i + αy i+2 ), the first vector yielding a codimension-8 kernel will likely come from a mixed form rather than from one of the y i 's, and we therefore need to isolate y i 's. 2. Repeat the same algorithm but we restrict test vectors w to U , and only accept a tested vector if it lies in more than one kernel, i.e., we solve i λ i H i v = 0, finding a basis (ŷ i ) i=1···s in quadratic forms, and keep v if the solution space is of dimension two or higher. Let this solution space be expressed in quadratic forms as v ∈ ker( s =1 α ŷ ) for s ≥ 2. We expect the dimension s to be 2 or 3. If we find two distinct sets of results (v and (ŷ i )) in say 5000 tests, then we have just found a y i for some 9 ≤ i ≤ 25, and the results would match the forms span(y i , y i±1 ). If, as is normally the case, we find only one solution space for λ i 's, then that must be span(y i , y i+1 ) or span(y i , y i+1 , y i+2 ) depending on its dimension. As an example, assume that we initially hit a vector that lies in the kernel U of y 8 + αy 9 and no other quadratic form. With probability 2 −8 a random vector v ∈ U will lie in ker y 8 ∩ ker y 9 = {x : Remark: Such equations would effectively have a minrank of 1. A similar situation occurs in multi-term combinations. This implies that TTM is very hard to secure -there can only be rank-4+ equations and not too many interlinks.
Other Attacks and Security Criteria for a Multivariate
What non-rank-based attacks are there? There are no other generic attack aside from 6 Linearization-like Methods, i.e. XL [7] and Gröbner Bases Algorithms [12, 13] . There are also attacks tailored against specific schemes. The most important is Bilinear Relations [25] , used against C * . It only works if the central maps are rank-2 in some embedding field. Neither this nor any other specific attacks work against the tame-like systems that we will construct below (see [3] ).
Proposition 6.
To build a tame-like Digital Signature Scheme needing a security of C:
If k linear combinations of central equations share a minimal rank r, then
we need
Here usually r = 2 where is the smallest number of cross-terms in an equation.
If every central variable appears in at least u central equations, then
3. Let v be the size of the smallest maximal set A of indices 0 ≤ i < n such that every cross-term in the central map has at least one index in A, then we require
Let
, then (c 0 , c 1 , γ are constants, ω is the order of the equation-solver):
5. There should not be any over-determined subsystems in the central equations. 8 The reader will need to refer to [1, 8, 34 ] to understand how Eq. 5 came about. The executive summary of the formula is the security when an attacker guesses at an optimal number of variables then runs either the Gröbner Bases algorithm F 5 [12] or the FXL algorithm [7] using a sparse solver with speed comparable to Lanczos. We do not know for sure what the parameters should be in Eq. 5. The theoretical best limit for F 5 is given by ( [34] ) is roughly c 0 = 4, c 1 = 1 4 , γ = 2, ω = 2 when counting field multiplications. To our knowledge no one comes close. Indeed, all commercially available software (including MAGMA, of the University of Sydney, which is reputed to be the best) have ω = 3, according to many tests. A rough implementation of FXL with a sparse solver can currently do about c 0 ≈ 20, c 1 ≈ 1, γ ≈ 4, ω = 2.
Building Example Schemes: Enhanced TTS
What fast tame-like signature scheme would we come up with in full knowledge of what we now understand, to get to a complexity of 2 80 3DES blocks (2 86 multiplications)?
1. The hash needs to be 160-bit, or m ≥ 20 (birthday attacks), and n ≥ m. 2. We need m ≥ 20 for XL/F 5 attacks (we would need m ≥ 22 if q = 2 7 ). 3. We need r > 8, so there must be at least 5 independent cross-terms in each equation, probably 6 or 7 to account for the "crawl" of Sec. 9. 4. We do not want n too large because that adds to the key length and running times, and we may open ourselves to searching attacks cf. [3] . 5. We need u ≥ 9, so every variable must appear in at least 9 equations.
The following seems to be reasonable approaches to ensure the above:
-We choose not to search. Therefore we are restricted to an "Oil-and-Vinegar"-like approach of taking random values for some variables and solving for the rest. -We need an initial segment with 6 or 7 cross-terms per equation. This will be solved as a linear system when the "vinegar-like" variables have been assigned. -We need a final segment in at least the last 9 variables. -One vinegar variable can provide one cross term per equation in the initial segment. -If possible, the two systems we solve should be of equal dimension.
So we may do a signature scheme with the following central map φ 2 : 
This is the [35] central map modified to avoid the UOV attack. Of course, we need to show that the new variant can scale up if our estimate is somewhat off, or to meet future, higher security requirements. We will discuss this next in Sec. 12. Note that our φ 2 above can be inverted reliably as follows:
1. Assign x 1 , . . . , x 7 and try to solve the first nine equations for x 8 to x 16 . 2. If we fail to solve the first system of equations, just redo everything from scratch. The probability is around 255/256 that this system can be solved.
As the determinant of the first system (for any x 1 through x 6 ) is a degree-9 polynomial in x 1 there can only be at most 9 choices of x 1 to make the first system degenerate, so the odds to solve this system is at least 247/256 and we will eventually hit upon a solution. 3. Solve serially for x 17 and x 18 using the next two equations (y 17 and y 18 ). 4. Assign a random x 0 and try to solve the second system for x 19 through x 27 . Again, there will be at most nine x 0 that makes the determinant of the second system zero. So, if the first attempt to solve it fails, try other x 0 until a solution is found.
We will call this TTS/5 or Enhanced TTS (20, 28) . Its operates as follows:
To Generate Keys: Assign non-zero random values in K = GF( 2 8 ) to parameters p ij ; generate random nonsingular matrices M 1 ∈ K 28×28 and M 3 ∈ K 20×20 (usually via LU decomposition) and vector 
Scaling Up Enhanced TTS
We can scale up Enhanced TTS to provide for a security of C 2 16k . This sequence of TTS instances we will call the "odd sequence" because u is odd. We have (for ≥ 4) the (m, n) = (4 , 6 − 2), with security parameters (u, r, v) = (2 − 1, 4 − 6, 4 − 1)
To account for more optimistic estimates for FXL/FF 5 , there is a different sequence of Enhanced TTS instances with the same Rank Attack estimates. These instances are called the "even sequence" because the parameter u is even. In φ 2 below, we have (m, n) = (4 , 6 − 4), with security parameters (u, r, v) = (2 − 2, 4 − 10, 4 − 2).
This φ 2 gives about 2 16 × higher FXL/FF 5 complexity for corresponding instances. The performance of Enhanced TTS (24, 32) is also given in Tab. 1.
Remark:
A program for finding maximum cliques can verify that the UOVattack parameter v is as given above. We have no space to explain the design.
We can estimate φ −1 2 to do ≈ 6k 2 (k + 2) multiplications for small k. This almost equals the work done in matrices M 1 and M 3 at m = 20, n = 28, and will overtake them when m increases. We further know that asymptotically as k increases, the dimensions n and m to build a TTS instance or another tame-like scheme with security level 2 16k both increase linearly (cf. [34] ). Thus, time cost of a TTS-like signature scheme goes up roughly with k ω , where 2 < ω ≤ 3 is the order of an elimination. Private map timings for RSA and ECC also increase between the quadratic and cubic to size. So the Triangular+OV construction will remain hundreds of times faster than RSA at comparable security levels. Table 2 gives this comparison. Timings on an 8051-compatible is essentially the same as in [35] and maintains a good lead over comparable schemes.
Discussions and Conclusion
There is recently a small resurgence of interest in multivariates, with perturbed variations of HFE [10] and C * and the non-big-field signature schemes TRMS Table 2 . Security Estimates of TTS instances, (m, n) = hash and signature sizes ([4] , this resembles a tame-like system) and Rainbow [9] , essentially a presparsified version of TTS. This is a welcome development, obviously. At the moment there are no serious reductionist "proof of security" study for multivariates. In that context, We have explained how the central map can affect the security under rank-based attacks and showed how combining the oiland-vinegar and triangular approaches leads to tame-like signature schemes that are less susceptible to attack on rank.
Tame-like schemes are very fast. The Enhanced TTS instances given here needs no co-processor to run on a really low-end smart card [35] . There is however much research to be done before sparse variants can gain wide currency and trust.
